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Abstract 
This paper investigates reward expiry for loyalty programs. It provides insights into the 
profitability of setting reward expiry for competing firms and identifies conditions under which 
such a policy would be beneficial. We develop and solve a game-theoretic model that reflects 
consumer behavior in choosing products and redeeming rewards. Applying a new iterative 
algorithm, we get the Nash equilibrium outputs for three scenarios (games): (1) neither firm sets 
an expiry date, (2) both firms set an expiry date, and (3) only one firm sets an expiry date. 
Comparison of the firms' profits across scenarios shows that the firms' prices and profits are 
affected by the loyalty program of the competing firm and by consumers' valuation of rewards and 
of time to rewards. In particular, a firm offering rewards that do not expire should increase its price 
if the competing firm changes its reward policy from no expiry to expiry, even when the expiry 
period is quite long. Finally, when customers highly value rewards and time, reward expiry is a 
dominant strategy for both firms. This means that firms would benefit from setting expiry on their 
loyalty rewards only if their customers highly value both rewards and time. Alternatively, both 
firms' rewards should not expire if consumers have low valuations of both rewards and time. 
 
Keywords: Loyalty programs, Iterative algorithm, Multinomial logit models, Game theory, 
Reward expiry, Operations Management. 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent industry reports show that firms spending for loyalty programs (LPs) has exceeded $1 
billion (Kumar, 2008), with the number of memberships nearing 3 billion in the US in 2012 (Berry, 
2013). The popularity of LPs is due to their effectiveness in building and reinforcing customer 
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loyalty by offering benefits to consumers in exchange for their repeat patronage to the company 
(Rust et al., 2000; Sharp & Sharp, 1997; Buckinx & Van den Poel, 2005; Li et al., 2006; Van den 
Poel & Lariviere, 2004).  
Given the considerable investments that firms are allocating to LPs, it is important for 
managers to understand the implications of such programs for the firms’ revenues and profits. This 
is especially important since these programs can offer different benefits to consumers and present 
different features that can affect customers’ purchasing and redemption decisions. In particular, 
one can observe varying reward expiry policies by firms across different industries. For example, 
in the airline industry, JetBlue has recently changed its loyalty program to match the policy of its 
main competitor, Delta, by cancelling the expiry of its travelers' reward points (Yahoo news, 
2013). However, other companies such as United, Alaska Airlines and Air France maintained the 
expiry of their rewards. We observe similar variations in reward expiry policies for LPs offered by 
gas companies. In the US, points earned through the BP Driver reward card program expire after 
one year, Shell Fuel rewards expire after one month, while Esso points do not expire. It is unclear 
how competing firms decide of incorporating reward expiry in their loyalty programs, whether 
such policies benefit competing firm and if so under what conditions.   
The purpose of this study is to analyze the implications of reward expiry for competing 
firms. Specifically, we aim to identify whether firms should set expiry on their rewards or not 
given the competitor’s chosen policy. We focus on reward policies where a fixed number of 
purchasing is necessary before a consumer can claim his/her rewards. This is the common loyalty 
program of the kind ‘buy n, get one free’ used in the restaurant and hoteling industries (e.g., 
McDonald’s, Starbucks and Second Cup loyalty cards). In such LPs, some companies impose 
reward expiry while others do not. For example, while McDonald’s McCafe rewards do not 
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expire3, Starbucks’ Stars reward and 7-Eleven’s loyalty rewards do. Starbucks Stars rewards are 
earned and accumulated at every purchase. They can be redeemed as a free product once the 
customer has accumulated enough rewards to cover the cost of a free product. The policy posted 
on the Starbucks Stars reward program’s website specifies that “If you do not earn at least three 
hundred (300) new Stars in each consecutive 12- month period, your Stars will expire and your 
Star balance will automatically reset to zero (0).”4 7-eleven loyalty rewards are earned at every 
drink purchase (using a virtual loyalty card via an App). The customer has to accumulate rewards 
to get a free drink after accumulating rewards from six purchases. According to 7-Eleven’s loyalty 
program’s terms of use, “unused reward drink will expire 366 days after it appears in the App.”5 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the implications of reward expiry for competing 
firms. Specifically, we aim to identify whether firms should set expiry on their rewards or not 
given the competitor’s chosen policy. To do so, we develop a game-theoretic model and obtain the 
optimal reward expiry duration as well as price for competing firms offering similar products at 
uniform pricing (e.g., coffee shops and gas stations). We investigate the effects of setting reward 
expiry on the competing firms’ profits as well as on consumers’ redemptions. Finally, we identify 
the Nash equilibrium solution and discuss conditions under which both firms, none, or only one 
should set an expiry on its loyalty rewards. Such analysis will provide managers with insight into 
whether reward expiry can be profitable, and if so, under what conditions. It will also provide 
guidelines to competing firms on how to react to competitor’s reward expiry policies. 





2. Literature Review 
We review the literature related to three main areas. First, we report the main findings related to 
loyalty programs. Second, we discuss research to date about the implications of reward expiry. 
Third and last, we expose the analytical literature about loyalty programs that used game theoretic 
modeling.  
2.1. Loyalty programs 
Loyalty programs are offered by companies to engage customers. This is done by offering rewards 
to those customers who repeat purchase the company’s product.  Multiple studies in the marketing 
literature have shown the beneficial impact of these programs on consumers’ behavior (Leenheer 
et al., 2007; Liu, 2007; Dorotic et al., 2012). LPs are found to favorably increase consumers’ 
purchases (Lal & Bell, 2003; Lewis, 2004; Liu, 2007; Taylor & Neslin, 2005) and the company’s 
market share (Leenheer et al., 2007).  
The existing research on LP rewards mainly consists in empirical findings and is focused 
on the attractiveness of different reward types and their impact on consumer responses (Kim et al., 
2001; Kivetz & Simonson, 2002; Noble et al., 2014; Wagner et al., 2009). For example, the 
literature reports different reward types and redemption policies employed in LPs. Rewards can 
be monetary, e.g., discounts, coupons, cash, or non-monetary, e.g., upgrades, access to special 
events (Jones et al., 2006; Mimouni-Chaabane & Volle, 2010). Furthermore, rewards redemption 
can be immediate or delayed. An example of the latter is the ‘buy n times, get one free’ reward 
policy commonly used in the restaurant industry for frequently purchased products such as coffee 
(e.g., McDonald’s, Starbucks and Second Cup loyalty cards).  
Despite this large literature on the effects of loyalty programs, reward redemption effects 
themselves have received relatively little attention in the existing literature (Bijmolt et al., 2012; 
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Dorotic et al., 2014; Smith & Sparks, 2009a). Some notable exceptions are the recent works by 
Stourm et al. (2015) and Dorotic et al. (2014). Using retail LP data, Stourm et al. (2015) finds 
evidence that customers use different “mental accounts” to evaluate cash and loyalty points. This 
result is in line with the mental accounting theory (Thaler, 1985), according to which customers’ 
increased utility from a gain, or disutility (pain) from a loss (payment), can vary depending on 
which currency (cash or reward) is being exchanged for the payment (Soman, 2003; Drèze & 
Nunes, 2009).  
The mental accounting theory can play an important role in customers’ redemption 
decisions since at every purchasing occasion, customers have to weigh their gain (either from 
accumulating points or from receiving a cash discount) versus their loss (either from redeemed 
rewards or from the missed opportunity of price savings). Dorotic et al. (2014) empirically studied 
the redemption behavior of over three thousand members of an LP and showed evidence of time 
pressure effects, which affects consumers’ evaluations of rewards soon to expire. These effects 
also influence consumers’ redemption vs. stockpiling decisions. More discussion will follow in 
the next section. 
2.2. Reward expiry 
The marketing literature provides contradictory findings related to the effects of reward 
expiry. Some research finds evidence that reward expiry may decrease customers’ satisfaction and 
motivation and create frustration (Stauss et al., 2005), which can lead to lower purchases (Dorotic 
et al., 2014). The fear of such negative effects may have encouraged some LPs to stretch their 
reward expiry periods or to abolish reward expiry altogether (Bijmolt et al., 2012).  
A few other studies find positive effects of reward expiry on consumer buying behavior 
and explain that reward expiry can create a time pressure mechanism that results in increasing 
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consumer purchases (e.g., Kopalle & Neslin, 2003; Drèze & Nunes, 2009; Dorotic et al., 2014). 
The goal-gradient theory explains this behavior; the closer a customer gets to the expiry period, 
the more he/she will feel the pressure to accumulate points, and the more likely that he/she will 
purchase the product of the firm offering the loyalty program with the soon to expire rewards 
(Kivetz et al., 2006; Kopalle et al., 2012). This time pressure mechanism can have positive effects 
on consumer purchases as it keeps consumers engaged with the LP and can lead to increased 
purchases in the period preceding redemption. Customers’ reward accumulation and redemption 
behavior can then be explained by their anticipation of obtaining future rewards and/or by 
switching costs, which together constitute the pressure to collect a sufficient amount of points for 
a reward (Hartmann & Viard, 2008; Kopalle et al., 2012; Lewis, 2004). 
Due to these complex effects, the implications of reward expiration in LPs remain largely 
unexplored. In their empirical study, Dorotic et al. (2014) note that “whether firms should 
encourage reward redemption and consider long-term expiration policies ranks among the least 
understood aspects of LPs”. This paper answers Dorotic et al.’s call to explore this issue. 
2.3. Game theoretic models about LPs 
Unlike the large empirical literature about LPs discussed above, there are only a few 
analytical studies about LPs. Among these, a small number has used game theoretic models to 
investigate the implications of loyalty programs for competing firms (e.g., Caminal & Matutes, 
1990; Klemperer, 1987b, 1995; Kim et al., 2001; Singh et al., 2008). In our knowledge, no 
analytical study, for one or multiple firms, has looked at the effects of reward expiry on firms’ 
profitability and consumer redemptions. This makes our research the first to investigate the 
implications of reward expiry for competing firms using a game theoretic approach.  
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The early work related to game-theoretic analysis of LPs is in the economics field (e.g., 
Klemperer, 1987b; Caminal & Matutes, 1990; Klemperer, 1995). In this literature, the consumer 
demand is derived from a Hotelling model, in which consumers’ preferences are uniformly 
distributed on a unit line. The modeled LPs are over two purchasing periods such as consumers 
who purchase in the first period can get a price discount as a reward in the second period. The 
main findings suggest that LPs that offer rewards as price discount on the next purchase introduce 
consumer-switching costs. These change consumer sensitivity to price, which then affect the firms’ 
pricing policies, consumer welfare and the level of competition between the firms.  
Following these economics studies, a few researchers have used a similar modeling 
approach to investigate the managerial implications of LPs for competing firms. In particular, Kim 
et al. (2001) study optimal reward type (price discount vs. free product) and LP profitability for 
undifferentiated competing firms. Using a similar modelling approach, they extend the previously 
developed Hotelling models by considering that the market is formed by two groups (segments) 
of consumers: heavy and light users. Heavy users buy a product in each period, whereas light users 
only buy in the first period, then exit the market and are replaced by a new group of consumers 
who buy in the next period. Their results show that the optimal reward type and the profitability 
of the LP for the competing firms mainly depends on the size of the consumer segments and their 
price sensitivity. Singh et al. (2008) use a similar model to Kim et al.’s to study whether firms 
should introduce an LP offering a price discount as reward. Although they do not solve for the 
optimal reward amount, they include an asymmetric game where one firm offers the LP and the 
other does not. They show that firms might be better off with no loyalty program even if the 
competitor is offering one. 
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2.4. Contributions 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we analytically explore for the first time 
the profitability of reward expiry in LPs. Second, contrary to previous studies that predominantly 
consider rewards as price discounts on the next purchase, we consider rewards of the form ‘buy n, 
get one free’. Third, unlike previous game-theoretic studies about LPs that relied on a Hotelling 
framework, we analytically obtain consumers’ demand using a discrete choice model (multinomial 
logit (MNL)). This approach allows us to capture customers’ stockpiling and redemption 
behaviors, which affect consumer demand in a market where rewards can be accumulated over 
time. In particular, we take into account the mental accounting theory to represent different 
consumer valuations of rewards and cash. We also model the time pressure effect that has been 
proved to affect consumer purchasing and redemption behavior. 
The objective of this paper is to assess whether reward expiry for LPs of the kind ‘buy n 
times, get one free’ is profitable for competing firms. Using our rich model that reflects consumer 
behavior related to the use of LPs, we hope that our results will provide managers with insight into 
whether reward expiry can be profitable and, if so, under what conditions. 
To analyze the impact of reward expiry on the competing firms’ profits and identify 
whether expiry is an equilibrium strategy for each of the firms, we solve three Nash games. In two 
of these games, both firms choose the same reward expiry policy (both either setting or not setting 
reward expiry). In the third game, the firms’ policies are asymmetric (one chooses reward expiry 
and the other does not). Comparison of equilibrium outputs across games provides insights into 
the effects of setting reward expiry on the firms’ revenues and profits and on consumers’ 
redemptions and the market conditions conducive for such policies. 
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The rest of this article is arranged as follows. Section 3 presents the model, Section 4 explains 
the method used to solve the three games, Section 5 and 6 deal with numerical results and 
discussions of the findings. Section 7 summarises and concludes. 
3. Model formulation 
3.1. Model set-up and assumptions 
We consider that the market is served by two competing firms named  and . Both firms are 
assumed to be rational decision makers, to have complete information about the market, and to 
make their decisions simultaneously. They both offer loyalty programs according to which 
consumers can redeem their rewards accumulated over a certain number of purchases and receive 
a free product as a reward.  
We assume that the competing firms offer undifferentiated products with a constant price 
during the purchasing periods to focus on mature industries characterized by dominant firms with 
similar market shares (e.g., coffee shops). Firms in such environment use marketing strategies 
aimed at increasing customers’ loyalty and are therefore concerned about issues related to the 
effective design of their loyalty programs. Finally, similar to previous studies (e.g., Singh et al., 
2008; Gandomi & Zolfaghari, 2013), and to exclude the impact of market expansion, the market 
size is normalized to one unit and kept constant. Table 1 includes a summary of the notations used 
for the model. 
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Table 1: List of notations 
Notation Definition 
 Firm index, ∈ ,  
 Customer index,  is an integer higher than 1 
 Reward period: Required number of purchases to receive Firm ’s reward 
 Firm ’s price  
 Expiry length of Firm ’s reward 
 Number of purchases from Firm  after the last redemption till the time of being 
eligible to receive the reward 
 Number of periods left for the customer to redeem his/her Frim ’s reward 
 Firm ’s revenue  
 Firm ’s reward cost  
 Firm ’s profit  
 Customers’ reward valuation coefficient, ∈ 0,1  
 Customers’ time valuation coefficient, ∈ 0,1   
 Customer ’s utility of choosing alternative , ∈ 0, 1, 0, 1  
 Deterministic part of customer ’s utility of choosing alternative  
 Random part of customer ’s utility of choosing alternative  
 Maximum expiry length  
 Probability of choosing alternative  by customer  
 Value of Firm ’s product for customer  
, , ,  Set of customers whose parameters are , , ,  in period  
, , ,  Set of customers whose parameters are , , ,  in a stationary demand condition 
, , ,  Number of customers in set , , ,   
, , , ,  Probability of choosing alternative z by the customers in set , , ,   
, ,  Value function of  rewards that can be redeemed after  and before  periods 
,  Lost value when customer gets one period closer to the expiry of  rewards that 
will be expired after  periods 
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The firms’ decision variables are represented by their prices  for Firm ∈ ,  , the loyalty 
reward period offered by each firm ( , ∈ , ), and the reward expiry period ( , ∈ , ). 
Both firms offer loyalty rewards to their consumers in form of a free product after a certain number 
of purchases (  for Firm ).6 This represents a common LP used by coffee shop chains such as 
Starbucks and Second cup, and retailers such as Seven eleven.  
To model the reward expiry period, we consider that the unit of time is the period of 
purchasing. Each firm can set expiry on the rewards earned by its customers by restricting the 
number of purchasing periods in which that reward should be redeemed. Let the positive integer 
 represent the expiry periods offered by Firm . More details about the firms’ loyalty programs 
will be provided later on in this section. 
To study whether firms should set expiry on their rewards in a competitive market, we need 
to solve a Nash game played by Firm  and Firm  where each player can either set or not set a 
reward expiry date. Let Expiry (E) and No Expiry (NE) be the possible strategies for each firm 
and ) be the profit of Firm . The payoff matrix of this game can be derived as shown in Table 
2.  
Table 2: The payoff matrix of the game  
Firm  
 
 Firm                  
No Expiry (NE) Expiry (E) 
No Expiry (NE)  , , ,  , , ,  
Expiry (E)  , , ,  , , ,  
 
                                                 
6 Note that lower values of  denote earlier reward given by Firm . 
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The scenario where both firms do not set reward expiry (NE, NE) is denoted by Scenario 1 
(S1), in which case  =  = ∞. The scenario where both firms set expiry (E, E) is Scenario 3 
(S3), such as ,  ≠ ∞. The case where Firm  does not set expiry while Firm  does (NE, E) is 
Scenario 2 (S2), which is characterized by 	∞ and ∞. Finally, the scenario where Firm 
 sets expiry while Firm  does not (E, NE) is equivalent to scenario S2 since firms are symmetric 
in this case except in their reward expiry decision. So the results for this case for Firm  ( ) are 
equivalent to those for Firm  ( ) in S2. 
To solve this game, we then study the three different scenarios (games). In the first scenario 
(S1), each firm has two decision variables (price and the time of reward). In scenario S2, Firm  
sets reward expiry while Firm  does not. In this case, Firm  has two decision variables (price 
and the time of reward) and Firm  makes three decisions (price, reward period, and expiry period). 
Finally, in scenario S3, each firm has three decision variables (price, reward period, and expiry 
period). Table 3 summarizes the three scenarios and the corresponding decision variables. 
We assume that, in the market served by the two firms, each consumer buys one unit of the 
product in each period of time from either Firm  or Firm . Consequently, customers’ valuation 
for the product is sufficiently high to exceed both firms’ products’ prices. Note that this assumption 
does not imply that the market is formed by two consumer segments of heavy and light users as in 
the previous literature that modeled rewards as a discount on the next purchase (Singh et al., 2008; 
Kim et al., 2001). This is because we consider a different kind of rewards of the kind ‘buy n, get 
one free’, which are commonly used in markets of frequently purchased products (e.g., coffee). 
Moreover, in each period, customers select the firm from which they purchase and decide either 
to redeem or not to redeem their cumulated rewards (if any). In this formulation, we allow 
consumers the possibility to freely switch between firms in each period of time. Therefore, we do 
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not impose any exogenous restrictions on consumers’ loyalty or purchasing behavior but rather let 
these behaviors to be endogenously derived by consumers’ utility functions. 
Table 3: Scenario definitions and firms’ decision variables 
Scenario Definition 
Firm ’s decision 
variables 
Firm ’s decision 
variables 
S1 Neither firm sets expiry and    and   
S2 Only one firm sets expiry  and ,  and  
S3 Both firms set expiry ,  and ,  and  
 
3.2. Consumer choice 
At each period of purchasing, the customer chooses one of the following four alternatives: (1) 
purchase from Firm  and not redeem (denoted by A0), (2) purchase from Firm  and redeem 
(denoted by A1), (3) purchase from Firm  and not redeem (denoted by B0), and, (4) purchase 
from Firm  and redeem (denoted by B1). Obviously, a customer who does not have Firm ’s or 
Firm ’s rewards can only choose between alternatives A0 and B0.  
Consumer choice is modeled according to the multinomial logit (MNL) model, which 
indicates that customers choose the option that results in the maximum utility. The MNL model is 
related to the revenue management models developed by Talluri & van Ryzin (2004) and widely 
used in the literature (e.g., de Palma et al., 1985; Anderson et al., 1985; Verma & Thompson, 1999; 
Liu & van Ryzin, 2008; van Ryzin & Vulcano, 2008; Hongmin & Woonghee Tim, 2011; Meissner 
& Strauss, 2012; Meissner et al., 2012; Topaloglu, 2013; Rusmevichientong et al., 2014). We have 
chosen the MNL model because it allows us to capture customers’ stockpiling and redemption 
behaviors, which are important considerations for ‘buy n, get one free’ type of loyalty programs 
and the reward expiry problem studies in this paper.  
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The MNL model serves as an analytical tool to describe the demand of consumers for the 
firms’ competing products. We start by formulating the consumer utilities obtained for the 
competing firms’ products and rewards. These utilities are then used to obtain the probabilities of 
consumer choices for purchases and reward redemption from each firm, which later will serve to 
obtain the expected number of sales for each firm, the costs of rewards paid to consumers, and the 
firms’ profit functions. 
Let  be the utility that consumer  obtains from alternative  such as, for any ∈{A0, A1, 
B0, B1}, , where 	  is the deterministic utility part and  is the random (unknown) 
component. Each customer chooses the alternative that provides him/her with the maximum utility. 
For instance, when choosing between alternatives A0 and B0, customer  would choose A0 if and 
only if . Therefore, the probability of choosing alterative A0 by customer  is the 
probability of having , which is equivalent . According to the 
logit model, each  is an independently and identically distributed Type I extreme value (also 
called Gumbel) with a specific location parameter and scale parameter 1 (see Ben-Akiva & Lerman 
1985). As a result,  follows a logistic distribution with mean zero and scale 1. Therefore, 
based on the CDF of the logistic distribution, the probability of  is equal to 
exp exp exp . The same logic applies for the situation where the customer 
chooses among multiple alternatives (see Train, 2009). Consequently, denoting  as the 
probability of choosing alternative ∈{A0, A1, B0, B1} by customer , we get: 
exp exp exp exp exp . (1) 
Based on the above equation, we can derive the probability of choosing alternative  by 
customer  using the deterministic component of customer’s utility in each alternative, which is 
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the surplus of the value gained by choosing that alternative subtracted by the value paid for it. 
Next, to model and formulate the customers’ gains and losses, we formulate the consumer value 
functions.   
3.3. Consumer value functions 
Based on the psychological theory of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985), we consider that 
customers have a higher valuation for cash than for reward. To model this mentality, consumers 
value  amount of reward as , where the parameter  denotes  customers’ sensitivity to reward 
relative to cash and varies in the range of (0,1).  
To model the effect of time pressure on customers’ utility, we assume that customers’ 
valuation of reward is affected by the time left to redeem the reward, (e.g., Besanko & Winston, 
1990), with closer periods to redemption resulting in higher utility for the customer, which creates 
the pressure to accumulate points. We apply a common discounting formula (Crosson & Needles, 
2008), and consider that one unit of reward earned at time t is valued at of 1 1⁄  at the 
present time, where  is equivalent to the interest rate for one period or discount rate, and is 
therefore between 0 and 1. Note that  represents consumer sensitivity to time, with higher values 
of  leading to lower values of rewards. Therefore, everything else being the same, the lower is 
, the more valuable become the rewards earned by consumers, and the higher is the time pressure 
effect. 
Based on the above explanations and considering both the mental accounting theory and 
consumers’ discounting of rewards, one can derive the value function, , , representing 
consumers’ evaluation of  units of reward after  periods as follows:  
, 1⁄ , (2) 
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with  and  representing customers’ sensitivity to reward value and to time pressure, 
respectively.  
Next, we model the effect of reward expiry. From equation (2), the value of  units of 
rewards that can be redeemed at the current period and never expire is equal to . However, in 
order to take into account reward expiry, the value function needs to depend on two different 
periods: the period after which the reward can be redeemed, , and the period after which the 
reward will be expired, . Therefore, we rewrite the value function in equation (2) as , , , 
which is given by the discounted value of rewards earned at  minus the discounted value of the 
rewards expired (lost) at  and is as follows: 
, , 1 1 . (3) 
As mentioned before, we consider customers’ utility in choosing alternative  as the surplus 
of the value gained by choosing this alternative subtracted by the value paid for it. Besides 
modeling a customer’s gain and loss of cash and of rewards associated with purchasing and 
redeeming rewards, our model also takes into account consumer disutility arising from getting 
closer to the reward expiry period. This is to represent the pressure a customer feels when his/her 
reward gets closer to expiry. To do so, we define the function W( , ), to represent the customer 
loss of  value of rewards that will be expired after  periods, when the customer gets one unit of 
time closer to the reward expiry period. Referring to equation (3), one can conclude: 
W , V , 0, V , 0, 1 1 1 . (4) 
3.4. Deterministic components of customer’s utilities 
Let  be the number of purchases by customer  from Firm  from the time of the last redemption 
until the time requested for receiving the reward ( ). This means that customer  is 
 periods away from qualifying to receive Firm ’s rewards respectively. Consequently, the 
18 
value of an additional purchase increases when the customer gets closer to the reward. In this 
regard, our model follows the goal gradient theory (Kivetz et al., 2006) indicating that the closer a 
customer is to a reward, the more likely a new purchase is.  
After reaching the required number of purchases to receive the reward ( ), each 
purchase gets the customer one period closer to expiry, which causes pressure to redeem. To model 
this fact, we define the time parameter of , which denotes customer ’s distance to the Firm ’s 
reward expiry period if he/she has the reward. This parameter is a positive integer with values that 
are lower than or equal to the firms’ expiry length ( ) for customers who have accumulated 
rewards, and zero for those who do not have reward. As a result, for a customer  who accumulated 
enough rewards to redeem, he/she posses  in reward value after  purchases which can be 
redeemed at the current period and will be expired after  periods. Based on these definitions, a 
customer’s situation can be specified by the four parameters ( , , , ).  
Based on the above definitions, and after formulating the value functions for the gain and 
loss of cash and rewards,  —the deterministic part of customer ’s utility in choosing alternative 
∈{A0, A1, B0, B1} — represents customer ’s surplus and is equal to the value gained by 
choosing alternative  subtracted by the value paid for it. Therefore,  is formulated as follows 
in equations (5-8).  
, , 																																								 			 	&		
, , , 			 				 	&		
, 																																																																 				 	&		
, , 																											 				 	&		
 (5) 
, 0, , 																																																 			 	&	




, , 																																									 		 	&		
, , , 				 				 	&		
, 																																																															 				 	&	
, , 																											 			 	&		
 (7) 
, 0, , 																																																 		 	&	
, 0, 																																																																								 			 	&		
∞																																																																																															 																						 	
 (8) 
where  is customer ’s valuation for Firm ’s product.  
In equations (5) and (7), the customer ’s surplus in purchasing from Firm  ( ) and not 
redeeming includes the value of the product ( , the loss of cash as price paid for the product 
( ), the value of getting closer to the reward (	 , ,
) if the customer has not completed the required number of purchases to redeem the reward 
( ), the disutility arising from the pressure of getting closer to the expiry of the firm’s 
reward ( , ) if the customer has completed the required number of purchases to get 
reward ( ), and from the pressure of getting closer to the expiry of the other firm’s 
reward ( , ) if the customer is qualified to receive that reward ( ).  
In equations (6) and (8), the customer ’s surplus in redeeming the reward of Firm  ( ) 
includes the value of the product ( , the loss of the accumulated reward ( , 0, ), 
the disutility arising from the pressure of getting closer to the other firm’s reward expiry 
( , ) if the customer is qualified to receive that reward ( ). When the 
customer has no reward from Firm  ( ) (	 ), redemption (alternative A1 (B1)) is not 
an option. To show this, a negative infinity value has been assigned to  and  under this 
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condition, which leads to dropping the term (exp	 ) from Equation (1) when the customer 
has no reward to redeem. 
Based on equations (1-8), the probability ( ) of customer  choosing alternative ∈{A0, 
A1, B0, B1} can be calculated. We assume that  since both firms sell the same 
product/service. It should also be mentioned that equations (5-8) are derived for scenario S3, where 
both firms set a reward expiry. In the scenarios where one or both firms do not set expiry (scenarios 
S1 and S2),	  and  are set to infinity, and the terms  also turn to infinity.  
3.5. Profit functions  
Each firm’s profit is equal to the revenues from selling its product minus the costs of 
redeemed rewards. Next, we use the probabilities of customer choice for each alternative obtained 
in the previous section to get the quantity of products sold (in units) for each firm and the number 
of redeemed rewards. 
As mentioned before, customer  is specified by the following four parameters: , , , 
. So, in period , all customers who have the same ( , , , ) have an equal probability of 
choosing alternative  and can therefore be grouped. Denoting this group as , , ,  and 
the probability of this group choosing  as , , , , , we get:  
, , , ∀	 	 	 	 	 , , , 	 ,																
, , , , ,			∀ ∈ 0, 1, 0, 1 , , , , .																					
 
Based on the above explanations, we derive the flow chart of customers between two 
subsequent periods (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). We then use it to identify the expected set of 
customers in the next period resulting from a given customer set , , ,  at a specific 
period , and the probability of transition to each possible set in period 1. Denote by 
, , ,   the number of customers in group , , ,  in period , one can then 
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derive all possible equations representing the transition between , , ,  and 
′, ′, ′, ′ . For instance one can say: 
2,3,0, 0 1,3,0, 0 ∗ , 1,3,0, 0 2,2,0, 0 ∗ , 2,2,0, 0 . 
In our model, we assume that the firms’ variables do not change between different periods. 
Consequently, a stationary demand condition can be assumed in which, given a specific set of 
market conditions , , , , the number of customers is constant in two subsequent 
purchasing periods, such as , , , , , , , , , . This 
assumption allows us to derive a number of independent equations corresponding to all possible 
values of , , ,  and to all possible combinations of , , , . Solving these 
equations simultaneously, we obtain different values of , , , , which can then be used 
to calculate the firms’ revenues (denoted by  and ), costs (denoted by  and ), and profits 
(denoted by  and ) in the stationary demand condition as shown in equations (9-11), 
respectively.  
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , , , , , , , , , 	
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , , , , , , , , , 	
, (9) 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , , , , , , 	
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , , , , , , 	
, (10) 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , , , , , , 	
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , , , , , , 	
. (11) 
The profit functions in Equation (11) show that the firms’ decision variables (price, reward 
period and expiry length) affect the expected probability of consumers’ choice for each alternative 
(  and the number of purchases for each product ( ), which in turn affect each firm’s revenues 
and costs (rewards paid to consumers), therefore profits.  
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Finally, It should be noted that although in equations (9-11) the parameters  and  
change in the ranges of [0, ] and [0, ] respectively, some special combinations of 
, , ,  are not logically possible. For example , , ,  is not possible because 
customers only purchase from one firm at each period and therefore cannot become eligible to 
receive the reward of both firms at the same time. Using the same logic, one can argue that 
	  when  and .  
4. Solving the model 
To study the profitability of setting reward expiry or not, we solve a Nash game played by Firm  
and Firm  where each player can either set or not set reward expiry (Table 2). To find such an 
equilibrium, we obtain, then compare the firms’ optimal profits in scenarios S1, S2 and S3. In each 
scenario, we solve a subgame in which the optimal values of the firms’ decision variables are 
determined by maximizing simultaneously the firms’ profits, each one in terms of its own decision 
variables. For instance, in scenario S3 (where both firms set reward expiry), the firms’ profits are 
functions of the decision variables of Firm  ( ,  and ) and of Firm  ( ,  and ). 
Therefore, for given values of parameters (  and ), the solution in S3 is obtained by solving 
the two following optimization problems simultaneously: 
(I) , ,   
s.t.  and  are integers, 0. 
(II) , ,   
s.t.  and  are integers, 0. 
In order to solve the firms’ problems simultaneously in each scenario, we employ an iterative 
algorithm explained in Table 4. This algorithm is based on the definition of a Nash equilibrium, 
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which is the condition under which neither firm can increase its profit by unilaterally deviating 
from that condition to any other possible one (Nash, 1951).  
An analytical solution to find the best response (optimal decision variables), if available, is 
difficult to derive because the profit functions are highly nonlinear. Therefore, we resort to 
numerical analyses by considering reasonable limits for the decision variables. We set the required 
number of purchases to receive Firm ’s reward, represented by the positive integer , to be equal 
or less than 10. When 10, Firm  gives reward after 10 purchases, which is commonly used 
in many loyalty programs such as the ones offered by McDonald, Starbucks and Second Cup.  
Next, looking at Firm ’s expiry lengths, , we consider an upper limit equal to . At equal 
or higher values than , the expiry length is considered to be very large and is perceived by 
customers as if there was no reward expiry, meaning that customers do not differentiate between 
a point that expires after  and a point that never expires. According to the customers’ value 
functions in Equation (2), as the expiry length of a reward point increases, its value increases, and 
the value reaches its maximum amount when the expiry length is infinity. Therefore, to set , 
we find the expiry length at which the value of a point reaches a very high percentage of its 
maximum value. Since the value function is decreasing in the customer’s sensitivity to reward 
distance ( ),  is chosen as the expiry length under which one point has 99 percentage of its 
maximum value for the most non-sensitive customers to reward distance (those whose  is 
minimum). Based on this definition, one can conclude: 
ceil ln	 100 ln	 1 min⁄ . (12) 
Finally, we do not consider a maximum limit for the prices, and for each combination of ( , 
), optimal prices in the range of (0, ∞) are found that maximize each firm’s profit. Employing 
Matlab’s fmincon function, which uses an interior-point algorithm based on Byrd et al (2000), we 
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are able to reach the optimal price with the accuracy of 32 decimal digits. As a result, we obtain 
and report the optimal decisions ( ,  and ). 
Using the algorithm (e.g., Table 4 for S3), we find the closest condition to the equilibrium with 
an error of (0.001). Although we do not obtain the exact equilibrium, we are able to check for the 
conversion of the algorithm. If it does not converge, it can be concluded that either there are more 
than one equilibrium solution or there is no equilibrium.  
Table 4: Equilibrium finder algorithm (S3) 
 task 
1 Find optimal response [ , ,  ] for initial strategy of [ 1, 1, 0] 
2 Find optimal response [ , ,  ] for the strategy of [ , , ]  
3 [ , ,  ]- [ , ,  ]) 
4 While , do 
5 Find optimal response [ , ,  ] for strategy of [ , ,  ]  
6 Find optimal response [ , ,  ] for the strategy of [ , ,  ] 
7 [ , ,  ]- [ , ,  ]) 
8 end while 
 
In our framework, the parameters  and  are bounded in the (0,1) interval. To make this 
range more realistic, we consider values in the range of [0.5, 0.9] for  and [0.1, 0.5] for  with 
a step size of 0.1. This results in 25 different combinations of these parameters. In order to give a 
better sense of these parameters and justify the mentioned limits, notice that 0.5 means that 
the customer evaluates one dollar in reward as 50 cents, and 0.5 means that a reward loses 
half of its value after one unit of time. Given these ranges, inequality (12) results in  equal to 
50. 
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At the last step, in order to find the equilibrium solution for the general game (Expiry or No 
Expiry), we compare the optimal profits for Firm  and Firm  in scenarios S1, S2, and S3. 
5. Results  
We use equations (1-11), and apply the solution method explained in the previous section to get 
each firm’s optimal decision variables and profits in each scenario (S1, S2, and S3). These 
outcomes are obtained for different combinations of the parameters representing consumer 
sensitivity to rewards ( ) and to time ( ). We then solve the general game in which the firms 
decide about choosing reward expiry or not for all 25 combinations of parameters  and . We 
do so by comparing these outcomes for each firm, and under different scenarios (subgames). The 
following sections present results for each scenario separately, and then in comparison with each 
other.  
5.1. Scenario 1 (S1): neither firm sets reward expiry 
In this scenario, both firms do not set an expiry date for the rewards they offer their customers. 
They decide the required number of purchases before a customer can be rewarded a free product, 
 and , and choose their prices,  and , which maximize their profits when the market 
reaches a stationary demand condition. In the beginning of the selling horizon, both firms set their 
decision variables simultaneously without knowing each other’s decisions. Using the algorithm 
explained in Table 4, we seek a Nash equilibrium such as the optimal decision of each firm is the 
best response to the other firm’s strategy for each of the 25 considered value combinations of  
parameters  and . Finally, we compute the firms’ optimal profits,  and . 
As expected, the firms’ optimal strategies are equal under Scenario S1 since firms are 
symmetric in this set-up. Therefore, we drop the subscripts in this scenario to denote the optimal 
strategies of each firm. The optimal decisions and profits are shown in Table 5.  
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Table 5: Optimal decision variables and profits in Scenario S1 for combinations of  &  
 
 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
N p I N p I N p I N p I N p I 
0.5 5 3.14 1.317 4 2.865 1.159 3 2.765 1.057 3 2.624 1.005 3 2.522 0.966 
0.6 5 3.399 1.428 4 3.043 1.234 3 2.905 1.116 3 2.737 1.053 3 2.616 1.007 
0.7 5 3.483 1.468 4 3.125 1.273 3 2.959 1.144 3 2.796 1.083 3 2.672 1.036 
0.8 6 3.368 1.46 4 3.063 1.255 4 2.864 1.175 3 2.776 1.084 3 2.672 1.045 
0.9 7 3.184 1.41 5 2.928 1.247 4 2.781 1.149 3 2.683 1.06 3 2.615 1.033 
When reward expiry is not offered by both firms, the results in Table 5 reveal that the 
equilibrium pricing and reward strategies as well as the firms’ profits are strongly related to 
consumers’ valuations of rewards compared to cash ( ), and to consumers’ discount rate ( ). 
These effects are summarized in the proposition below.  
Proposition 1: In scenario S1, everything else being the same, the equilibrium solution reacts as 
follows to changes in  and : 
1.a. each firm’s price, profit and reward period ( ) decrease with higher levels of .  
1.b. each firm’s price and profit increase as  takes higher values for 0.7, then decreases 
with higher values of  that exceed 0.7. 
Proposition 1.a shows the effects of the discount rate at equilibrium. In markets 
characterized by “impatient” consumers who strongly prefer immediate rewards (high ), both 
firms should charge lower prices and offer the reward sooner to consumers at equilibrium. Given 
that both firms choose the same strategies at equilibrium, the market is divided between them. 
Therefore, a decrease in price leads to lower revenues. This in turn results in shrinking the firms’ 
profits at equilibrium for higher levels of . Hence, firms that offer LP rewards with no expiry 
find it more profitable to offer such programs in markets where consumers have the lowest 
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discount rates. Finally, the reward period at equilibrium increases as  increases, but its value 
becomes stagnant ( 3) for high values of the discount rate. The explanation for this finding is 
that the consumers’ high discount rate leads to lower valuations of the rewards. Therefore, the 
reward period of the firm needs to be short to avoid further devaluating the value of the rewards 
offered to consumers. 
Looking at the effects of reward valuation compared to cash ( ), the result in proposition 
1.b shows that, everything else being the same, firms should charge higher prices when consumers 
have moderate valuations of rewards compared to cash, while prices should be lower for markets 
characterized either by very low or very high consumer valuations of rewards. In fact, the firms’ 
optimal price increases as  takes higher values for 0.7, then decreases with higher values 
of  that exceed 0.7. Finally, variations in  affect the firms’ optimal profits in a similar way 
than prices. Therefore, both firms will earn the highest profits under market conditions where they 
can charge the highest prices to consumers, which is for moderate values of . This result shows 
the importance of considering different mental accounts to represent consumers’ valuations of cash 
and reward. In fact, without such an approach (i.e., if  was assumed equal to one), the firms 
would charge a lower price than what consumers are willing to pay for the product, therefore 
missing out on profit opportunity. 
Finally, the results for scenario S1 also suggest that the influence of consumers’ valuations 
of rewards compared to cash and discount rate on the firms’ optimal strategies and profits are 
interdependent. In particular, when the consumer discount rate is low, firms should extend their 
reward period ( ) with higher consumer rewards valuations ( ). However, the optimal reward 
period becomes insensitive to  when the discount rate is high, in which cases the firms should 
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offer a free product as reward in the third period regardless of consumers’ valuation of rewards 
compared to cash.  
5.2. Scenario 2 (S2): only one firm sets reward expiry 
In Scenario S2, both firms offer rewards after a required number of purchases, however, only Firm 
 sets an expiry date for the reward. Firm  then decides of its price ( ), the required number of 
purchases to receive the reward ( ), and the expiry length ( ), while Firm  decides of its price 
( ) and the required number of purchases to receive the reward ( ). Using the methods explained 
in Table 4, we seek a Nash equilibrium for the game played by Firm  and , where the optimal 
decision of each firm is the best response to the other one’s strategy. Similar to the previous 
scenario, the first step is identifying the firms’ optimal decision variables in Scenario S2 for each 
of the 25 different combinations of parameters  and . Then, the firms’ optimal profits (  and 
) are computed. Given that the firms are not symmetric in S2, their optimal choices are different. 
The results are shown in Table 6 for Firm  and in Table 7 for Firm .  
Table 6: Firm ’s optimal decision variables and profits in Scenario S2 for  &   
 
 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Na pa Ia Na pa Ia Na pa Ia Na pa Ia Na pa Ia 
0.5 5 3.141 1.317 4 2.866 1.16 3 2.766 1.058 3 2.625 1.005 3 2.523 0.967 
0.6 5 3.401 1.429 4 3.044 1.235 3 2.907 1.116 3 2.739 1.053 3 2.617 1.008 
0.7 6 3.444 1.482 4 3.127 1.274 3 2.974 1.150 3 2.811 1.088 3 2.687 1.041 
0.8 6 3.386 1.472 4 3.132 1.292 4 2.938 1.200 3 2.849 1.116 3 2.733 1.069 
0.9 7 3.284 1.479 5 3.083 1.330 4 2.941 1.222 4 2.778 1.145 3 2.725 1.083 
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Table 7: Firm ’s optimal decision variables and profits in Scenario S2 for  &  
 
 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Nb Tb pb Ib Nb Tb pb Ib Nb Tb pb Ib Nb Tb pb Ib Nb Tb pb Ib 
0.5 5 50 3.129 1.312 4 50 2.867 1.160 3 50 2.767 1.058 3 50 2.625 1.005 3 50 2.523 0.967 
0.6 5 50 3.391 1.424 4 50 3.044 1.235 3 50 2.907 1.116 3 50 2.739 1.053 3 50 2.617 1.008 
0.7 5 50 3.512 1.485 4 50 3.127 1.273 3 19 2.979 1.150 3 15 2.815 1.089 3 15 2.692 1.042 
0.8 6 50 3.397 1.468 4 19 3.177 1.288 3 11 3.124 1.210 3 10 2.902 1.121 3 10 2.779 1.075 
0.9 7 33 3.373 1.464 4 13 3.32 1.335 3 9 3.229 1.240 3 8 3.031 1.178 3 8 2.851 1.100 
 
When reward expiry is offered by only one firm (Firm b), the results in Tables 6 and 7 
reveal the following main results.  
Proposition 2: In scenario S2, everything else being the same, the equilibrium solution reacts as 
follows to changes in  and : 
2.a. Firm a’s price, profit and reward period ( ) decrease with higher levels of . The 
optimal expiry period for Firm b ( ) either decreases or stays the same as  increases. 
2.b. Firm a’s price and profit increase (decrease) as  takes higher values for low (high) 
values of	 . Firm ’s reward and expiry periods decrease while its price and profit increase 
with higher values of . 
The result in proposition 2 shows first that, as in S1, the optimal pricing and reward 
strategies and therefore profits of each firm are strongly related to consumers’ valuations of 
rewards compared to cash ( ), and to their discount rate ( ). Second, the decision of Firm b to 
impose expiry of its rewards affects each firm’s strategies and profits differently. 
Looking at the effects of the discount rate ( ) on the equilibrium solution for each firm, 
the result in proposition 2.a shows that everything else being the same, each firm’s price, profit 
and reward period decreases with higher levels of . As in the previous scenario (S1), each firm 
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finds it more profitable to offer its LP in markets where consumers have the lowest discount rates. 
Furthermore, the optimal expiry period for Firm b ( ) either decreases or stays the same as  
increases, suggesting that in this case, Firm b should offer lower expiry and reward periods to 
impatient consumers to fully benefit of the time pressure mechanism.  
The effects of the reward valuation parameter ( ) on the equilibrium solution in S2 shows 
different impacts for the firm that offers expiry and for the one that does not. Proposition 2.b shows 
that for Firm , its equilibrium price and reward period react similarly to  than in S1, although 
the threshold on  now depends on the value of . Contrary to S1, Firm  does not earn its 
highest profit for those values of parameters at which its price is the highest. Indeed, Firm ’s 
profit increases with larger values of  for almost all values of . This is because Firm ’s profit 
is not driven solely by its price anymore since Firm ’s decision to impose expiry on its reward 
has led to an asymmetric game where the market shares are not equal. Therefore, a high price 
strategy can drive consumers away from Firm  and increase the share of its competitor, which 
makes a lower price the optimal solution in this scenario for Firm . 
For Firm , for almost all values of , both its reward and expiry periods decrease with 
higher consumer valuation of reward, while its equilibrium price and profit increase. With expiry, 
Firm ’s profit and price are both highest at the highest level of , which shows again a different 
pattern from the one observed in scenario S1. However, similar to S1, Firm  will earn its highest 
profit level at those market conditions when it can also charge the highest price at equilibrium. 
Despite the difference in market shares between firms in this scenario, Firm ’s reward expiry can 
motivate consumers’ purchase behavior enough to justify paying the high price charged for its 
product.  
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Therefore, everything else being the same, the firm that does not set reward expiry should 
charge higher prices when consumers have moderate valuations of rewards compared to cash, 
while firms offering rewards that expire should charge their highest prices in markets characterized 
by very high consumer valuations of rewards. However, both firms would earn their highest profits 
in markets where  is very high. Further, these results also suggest that the influence of 
consumers’ discount rate and their valuations of rewards compared to cash on the firms’ optimal 
strategies and profits are interdependent and together influence each firm’s optimal results 
differently. For Firm , the optimal reward period ( ) becomes insensitive to  only when the 
time pressure effect is very high ( 0.5). However, for Firm , the optimal reward period ( ) 
does not change with  for any 0.1.   
Finally, comparisons of the equilibrium strategies and profits of each firm shows the 
following results. The firm that offers reward expiry charges a higher price7, and offers the same 
or a lower reward period than the one that does not. The rationale for this result is provided by the 
time pressure mechanism that influences consumers’ purchasing and redemption behavior, which 
is more significant for Firm ’s customers than for those purchasing Firm ’s product. 
Comparisons of profits at equilibrium confirm this intuition since Firm  earns higher profits than 
Firm  in cases where the time pressure parameter is high enough ( 0.3). Alternatively, when 
consumers’ sensitivity to time pressure is too low to incite enough purchases, reward expiry makes 
Firm  earn a lower profit than Firm , especially, since the Firm ’s price is also higher under 
these conditions than Firm ’s price, which drives these customers further away from Firm ’ 
product.  
                                                 
7 Exceptions are noted for 0.1, 0.2 and 0.1. 
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5.3. Scenario 3 (S3): both firms set reward expiry 
In Scenario S3, both firms set an expiry date for the reward they offer. Therefore, each firm sets 
three decision variables: price, required number of purchasing to get the reward, and expiry length. 
Since Scenario S3 is a symmetric condition, as expected, the optimal decision variables are equal 
for both firms.  
Table 8: Each firm’s optimal decision variables and profits in Scenario S3 for  &   
 
 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
N T p I N T p I N T p I N T p I N T p I 
0.5 5 50 3.129 1.312 4 50 2.867 1.160 3 50 2.767 1.058 3 50 2.625 1.005 3 50 2.523 0.967 
0.6 5 50 3.392 1.425 4 50 3.044 1.235 3 50 2.907 1.116 3 50 2.739 1.053 3 50 2.617 1.008 
0.7 5 50 3.506 1.477 4 50 3.127 1.274 3 19 2.993 1.156 3 15 2.827 1.093 3 12 2.705 1.046 
0.8 6 50 3.416 1.480 4 19 3.252 1.327 3 11 3.213 1.240 3 9 3.007 1.162 3 8 2.844 1.101 
0.9 7 31 3.53 1.558 4 13 3.535 1.440 3 9 3.463 1.335 3 7 3.201 1.235 3 7 2.985 1.157 
 
As in the previous scenarios, when reward expiry is offered by both firms, the results in 
Table 8 reveal that the equilibrium pricing and reward strategies as well as the firms’ profits are 
strongly related to consumers’ valuations of rewards compared to cash ( ), and to consumers’ 
discount rate ( ). These effects are summarized in proposition 3 below.  
Proposition 3: In scenario S3, everything else being the same, the equilibrium solution reacts as 
follows to changes in  and : 
3.a. Each firm’s price, profit and reward period and reward expiry period decrease with higher 
levels of .  
3.b. As  takes higher values, each firm’s reward and expiry periods decrease, while price 
and profit increase. 
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The finding in proposition 3.a shows that when reward expiry is offered by both firms, the 
firms’ prices and profits decrease with higher values of the consumer discount rate ( ). As in the 
previous scenarios (S2), each firm finds it more profitable to offer its LP in markets where 
consumers are least sensitive to time. Furthermore, the firms’ reward and expiry periods at 
equilibrium also decrease or stay the same as ( ) increases. This means that both firms should 
offer a lower expiry and reward period to impatient consumers to fully benefit of the time pressure 
mechanism in this scenario.  
Looking at the effects of reward valuation compared to cash ( ) on equilibrium strategies, 
proposition 3.b shows that both firms’ reward and expiry periods decrease with higher consumer 
valuation of reward, while their price and profit increase. In this case, both firms can charge the 
highest price and thereby earn the largest profit in markets where consumers highly values rewards. 
This shows again a different pattern from the one observed in the previous scenarios when there 
is no reward expiry (i.e., in S1 and Firm  in S2). However, similar to S1, both firms will earn 
their highest profit level at those market conditions when they can also charge the highest price at 
equilibrium.   
5.4. General game  
In the previous sections, three sub-games were discussed and solved (scenarios S1, S2, and S3). 
Comparing optimal prices in S1 and those of Firm  in Scenario S2, one can conclude that a firm 
that applies no reward expiry should offer a higher price if its competitor sets expiry in comparison 
to the condition where its competitor also offers a no expiry policy. Similar comparisons between 
optimal prices in Scenario S3 and those of Firm  in Scenario S2 show that a firm that applies 
reward expiry should offer a higher price if its competitor also sets expiry compared with the 
condition where its competitor applies no expiry policy. 
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Next, knowing the firms’ profits in each of the scenarios, we can solve the general game in 
which the two firms decide about setting or not setting reward expiry. Based on Tables 4 to 7, we 
obtain the payoff matrix of this game for each combination of  and .  
Reward expiry by both firms (S3 or (E, E)) is the Nash equilibrium if the following inequalities 
are true: , ,  and , , , meaning that each firm does not have an incentive (i.e., 
does not earn higher profit) to not set reward expiry; and, setting expiry by both firms (S3) is Pareto 
improving compared to the case where they both do not set reward expiry (S1). 
Studying the payoff matrices obtained for each of the 25 combinations of parameters  and 
, one can identify the equilibrium solution for the general game as described in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 4: The equilibrium solution for the general game (whether to set reward expiry or 
not) depends on the values of   and  as described in Table 9. 
Table 9 shows the equilibrium solution for the game for different values of  and  (the 
specific results are included in Table A.1 in the Appendix). In Region I, setting expiry is a 
dominant equilibrium, i.e., each firm’s profit is highest when both firms impose expiry on their 
rewards. This area is characterized by high customers’ sensitivity levels to both time and reward.  
Further, in both Regions II and III, the optimal expiry length in S3 and in S2 for the firm that 
sets expiry are equal to the upper bound value ( 50). Therefore, we cannot be sure about 
the existence of the equilibrium solution in this case. However, given an optimal 50, one can 
say that in Region II, setting expiry by both firms is also a dominant strategy8. Finally, in Region 
III, where customers are not sensitive to reward and time, not setting expiry is the dominant Nash 
equilibrium. 
                                                 
8 An exception is when 0.1 and 0.7. In this case, there is no equilibrium solution. 
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Table 9: Different regions of the game between Firm  and Firm  
        
0.5 (Region III)      
0.6  (Region II)    
0.7       
0.8    (Region I)  
0.9       
 0.1 0.2 0. 3 0.4 0.5   
 
6. Discussion 
Our findings suggest that companies should actively assess the level of consumers’ valuations of 
rewards compared to cash and consumers discount rates when designing their loyalty programs. A 
key managerial implication from this study is that competing firms should adjust their optimal 
prices, reward and expiry periods given consumers’ preferences for rewards and sensitivity to time 
pressure, e.g., by offering distinct LP terms in markets differing along these dimensions.  
The importance of these two criteria in identifying the firms’ optimal strategies and best 
response to the competition can first be seen in the insights obtained from the symmetric game 
with no expiry (S1). The results we obtain in this case are different from previous studies in the 
literature that did not model reward expiry, nor the mental accounting and goal gradient theories, 
and focused on rewards in form of discounts on the next purchase (Singh et al., 2008; Kim et al., 
2001). In these works, the implicit assumption is that 0 and 1. Although our modeling 
approach is very different from these studies, a notable difference in our results to theirs is how 
variations in consumers’ preferences can explain differences in loyalty programs offered by 
competing firms across different markets. For example, managers of competing firms should offer 
36 
LPs with extended reward periods and simultaneously charge high prices if consumer discount 
rate is low and consumers highly value rewards, while simultaneously charge high prices only 
when consumers have moderate valuations of rewards compared to cash.  
The impact of consumer valuation of rewards compared to cash and their discount rate is 
also prevalent when one or both firms imposes expiry on its rewards, albeit the sensitivity of the 
equilibrium solution to these consumer preferences changes in such scenarios. In particular, the 
firms’ strategies and profits react similarly to changes in the consumer discount rate; i.e., prices 
and profits increase with higher values of  when reward expiry is implemented by one or both 
firm. However, the consumer valuation of rewards compared to cash influences differently 
equilibrium strategies and outputs with reward expiry, as prices and profits should be higher for 
higher levels of  for the firm(s) using the expiry policy.  
In addition to the effect of expiry on the sensitivity of the equilibrium solutions to changes 
in consumer preferences, the results we obtain in scenario S2 suggest that reward expiry (even 
when the expiry period is long) has an impact on the consumers’ purchase and redemption 
behavior, and consequently on the firms’ strategies, and profits. First, our results challenge the 
common assumption in practice that firms can gain a competitive advantage by offering a lenient 
LP policy (with no expiry). In particular, our findings indicate that the competitor’s decision to set 
reward expiry can be a disadvantage for the firm with the more lenient policy when consumer 
discount rates are high. This is because reward expiry in these conditions increases the time 
pressure of accumulating rewards and can lead to higher purchases. The firm with the reward 
expiry policy should also charges a higher price compared to the competitor in this case to take 
full advantage of the time pressure mechanism. Ultimately, this benefits the firm with reward 
expiry. Alternatively, reward expiry can also lead to a lower profit than the competitor’s if 
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consumer discount rates are low, in which case consumers are less sensitive to the time pressure 
effect and are more attracted to the lenient LP. These results explain the diverging results in the 
literature about the controversial effects of reward expiry (Kopalle & Neslin, 2003; Drèze & 
Nunes, 2009; Noble et al., 2014; Stauss et al., 2005; Dorotic et al., 2014; Bijmolt et al., 2012). For 
managers in charge of implementing and designing LPs, this means that reward expiry should be 
considered as a strategic decision that should be made according to consumers’ preferences and 
the competitor’s actions. 
Given these asymmetric effects of reward expiry on the firms’ strategies and profits, it is 
important to consider the equilibrium solution for each firm in the game where each can set or not 
set expiry. Our results indicate that setting reward expiry is a dominant equilibrium when 
customers value rewards highly enough and their discount rates are not too low. Otherwise, lifting 
the expiry restriction is more profitable for both firms. These results provide further explanations 
about the effects of reward expiry by showing that it can, not only provide a competitive advantage 
to the firm setting expiry unilaterally, but can also improve the profits of both competing firms.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper studies the effectiveness of designing loyalty programs where expiry is set on rewards 
offered to customers. The motivation for this research originates from the observation of different 
reward expiry policies across firms in different industries, as well as the lack of clear guidance in 
the literature about the impact of reward expiry on firms’ profitability and customers’ redemption 
of rewards (e.g., Breugelmans et al., 2015). In fact, empirical studies report that reward expiry can 
have positive and negative effects on consumer purchases. While it may frustrate customers and 
lower their satisfaction and motivation to buy the product, it can also make customers feel 
pressured to redeem their points before expiry thereby increasing consumer repeat purchases. 
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These effects are therefore largely guided by consumers’ valuations of rewards and of time 
pressure.  
We investigate the optimality of setting reward expiry for competing firms offering a 
loyalty program of the type ‘buy n times, get one free’. We develop a game-theoretic model that 
reflects consumer redemption/stockpiling and purchasing behaviors. In particular, our model takes 
into account the empirical observation that consumers value rewards differently from cash and feel 
a time pressure effect when confronted by time limitations to buy or accumulate/redeem rewards 
(Stourm, 2015). Consumers’ utility from purchasing and redeeming rewards is used to calculate 
the probability of consumer purchase and reward redemption from each firm, which then is used 
to get each firm’s profit. Our comprehensive model has the following unique properties. First, 
consumer choice is derived using utility functions that reflect both the mental accounting theory 
and the time pressure mechanism. Second, the model takes into account random effects in 
consumer utility and choice. Third, while most of the literature to date models reward as a discount 
on the next purchase, we analyze LPs of the kind ‘buy n, get one free’, in which rewards can be 
accumulated over a larger number of periods.  
We apply a numerical algorithm to obtain Nash equilibrium solutions for prices, reward 
and expiry periods (if any) and profits in three scenarios (subgames): (1) neither firm sets reward 
expiry, (2) both firms set reward expiry; and (3) only one firm sets reward expiry. Comparisons of 
equilibrium profits across scenarios provide the equilibrium solution for the main game in which 
each firm decides whether or not to set reward expiry, taking into account the reaction of the 
competing firm.  
Our main findings indicate that each firm’s price and profit are affected by the expiry policy 
of the competing firm’s LP, and by consumers’ valuation of rewards and discount rate. In 
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particular, a key managerial implication from this study is that competing firms should adjust their 
optimal prices, reward and expiry periods given consumer evaluations of rewards and sensitivity 
to time pressure. In particular, the price, profit and reward period of the firm that does not offer 
expiry decrease with higher levels of customer sensitivity to distance. As  takes higher values, 
reward and expiry period of the firms that offer expiry decrease, while their price and profit 
increase.  
Further, our findings challenge the common assumption in practice that firms can gain a 
competitive advantage by offering a lenient LP policy (with no expiry) while the competitor sets 
reward expiry. This is because expiry can increase the pressure for consumers to accumulate 
rewards, therefore leading to higher purchases, even at higher prices. Reward expiry can also lead 
to lower profit than the competitor’s if consumer discount rates are low, in which case consumers 
are less sensitive to the time pressure effect and are more attracted to the lenient LP. These results 
explain the diverging results in the literature about the positive and negative effects of reward 
expiry. For managers in charge of implementing and designing LPs, this means that reward expiry 
should be considered as a strategic decision that depends on consumers’ preferences and on the 
competitor’s actions. Finally, our findings indicate that setting reward expiry is a dominant 
equilibrium when customers value rewards highly enough and their discount rates are not too low. 
Otherwise, lifting the expiry restriction is more profitable for both firms. These results further 
explain the effects of reward expiry by showing that it can, not only provide a competitive 
advantage to the firm setting expiry unilaterally, but also improve the profits of both competing 
firms. 
This research provides for the first time an analytical framework to assess the benefits from 
loyalty reward expiry for competing firms using a consumer-oriented approach. This analysis 
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could be extended in several ways. For instance, our model is useful to firms operating in mature 
industries and facing similar competitors such as the case for food or entertainment industries. 
Firms in such industries usually use a uniform pricing strategy and use marketing strategies aimed 
at increasing customers’ loyalty. Future research can adapt our model to study other set-ups such 
as asymmetric products where customers might have significantly different evaluations for each 
firm’s product. This can change our results since some empirical studies have showed that LPs 
mainly benefit large-share brands and those firms with a previously established competitive 
advantage (Sharp & Sharp, 1997; Meyer-Waarden & Benavent, 2010; Leenheer et al., 2007). An 
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Figure A1: Flow chart between purchasing periods  and 1 
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Table A.1: Payoff matrix of the game between Firm  and Firm  
 
 
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
0.5 [3,3] [4,1] [1,1] [3,2] [1,1] [3,2] [1,1] [3,2] [1,1] [3,2] 
[1,4] [2,2] [2,3] [4,4] [2,3] [4,4] [2,3] [4,4] [2,3] [4,4] 
0.6 [3,3] [4,1] [1,1] [4,2] [1,1] [3,2] [1,1] [3,2] [1,1] [3,2] 
[1,4] [2,2] [2,4] [3,3] [2,3] [4,4] [2,3] [4,4] [2,3] [4,4] 
0.7 [1,1] [3,4] [1,1] [3,2] [1,1] [3,2] [1,1] [2,3] [1,1] [2,3] 
[4,3] [2,2] [2,3] [4,4] [2,3] [4,4] [3,2] [4,4] [3,2] [4,4] 
0.8 [1,1] [3,2] [1,1] [3,2] [1,1] [2,3] [1,1] [2,3] [1,1] [2,3] 
[2,3] [4,4] [2,3] [4,4] [3,2] [4,4] [3,2] [4,4] [3,2] [4,4] 
0.9 [1,1] [3,2] [1,1] [2,3] [1,1] [2,3] [1,1] [2,3] [1,1] [2,3] 
[2,3] [4,4] [3,2] [4,4] [3,2] [4,4] [3,2] [4,4] [3,2] [4,4] 
 
In Table A.1, each firm’s profit obtained in each of the four possible combinations of strategies 
are ranked from lowest (rank of 1) to highest (rank of 4) for each combination of  and . The 
result is denoted by ( , ) for , 1, . .4, where  is the rank of preference of the strategy 
for Firm  and  is the rank of preference of the strategy for Firm . 
